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Abstract: The Great Recession’s effect on state school finance systems was unlike previous 
downturns in the early 1990s and early 2000s in that it a) involved a greater loss of taxable income in 
many states, thus greater loss to state general fund revenues, b) also involved a substantial collapse 
of housing markets and related reduction or at least leveling of growth of taxable property wealth, c) 
but also involved a substantive infusion of federal “fiscal stabilization” aid to be used to fill holes in 
state general aid formulas. The goal of this study is to evaluate the effects of the recession on equity 
of state school funding systems with respect to child poverty concentrations. Using school district 
level panel data from 1993 to 2011, we evaluate the interplay between local, state and federal source 
revenues through the course of the recent recession by comparison with the less severe economic 
downturn of the early 2000s. Then using state level estimates of elasticities between revenue and 
spending measures and district poverty rates, we estimate whether changes in the distribution of 
state, local or federal revenue contribute most to changes in overall equity of current spending and 
whether those contributions changed during the recent recession.  
Keywords: school funding; fiscal stabilization; recession; poverty; equity 
Evaluando el impacto de la recesión en los sistemas estatales de financiamiento educativo 
Resumen: El efecto de la Gran Recesión en los sistemas estatales de financiamiento educativo fue 
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diferente a las crisis anteriores en la década de 1990 y principios de 2000, ya que a) implicó una 
mayor pérdida de renta imponible en muchos estados, por lo tanto una mayor pérdida de ingresos 
del fondo general, b) también implicó una caída sustancial de los mercados de vivienda y la 
reducción relacionada o, al menos, la nivelación del crecimiento de la riqueza propiedad imponible, 
c), también involucró una infusión sustantiva de ayuda federal para la "estabilización fiscal" que se 
utilizó para cubrir déficits en las fórmulas generales de sobre de los presupuestos estatales. El 
objetivo de este estudio es evaluar los efectos de la recesión en la equidad de los sistemas de 
financiación de escuelas estatales en relación a las  áreas de concentración de pobreza infantil. 
Utilizando datos de panel a nivel de distrito escolar 1993-2011, se evalúa la interacción entre los 
ingresos de fuentes locales, estatales y federales a través del curso de la reciente recesión en 
comparación con la crisis económica de la década de 2000 que fue menos severa. Luego, utilizando 
estimaciones a nivel estatal de las elasticidades entre las medidas de ingresos y de gastos y los índices 
de pobreza del distrito, se estimó si más cambios en la distribución de ingresos estatales, locales o 
federales contribuyen a los cambios en el patrimonio neto total del gasto corriente y si esas 
contribuciones cambiaron durante la reciente recesión.  
Palabras clave: financiamiento escolar; estabilización fiscal; recesión; pobreza; equidad. 
Avaliando o impacto da recessão sobre os sistemas de financiamento da educação do 
estado  
Resumo: O efeito da Grande Recessão nos sistemas estaduais de financiamento da educação foi 
diferente das crises anteriores na década de 1990 e início de 2000, porque: a) envolveu uma maior 
perda de rendimentos tributáveis em muitos estados, porém maior perda de receitas de fundos 
gerais, b) também significou uma queda substancial no mercado imobiliário e a redução relacionada 
ou, pelo menos, igualação do crescimento da propriedade tributável, c), também involucro uma 
infusão substancial de ajuda federal para "estabilização fiscal" que foi usada para cobrir déficits nas 
fórmulas gerais dos orçamentos estaduais. O objetivo deste estudo é avaliar os efeitos da recessão 
sobre a equidade do financiamento das escolas estaduais em relação às áreas de concentração de 
pobreza infantil. Usando dados de painel para 1993-2011 a nível de distrito escolar, se avalia a 
interação entre os rendimentos de fontes locais, estaduais e federais ao longo da recente recessão em 
comparação com a crise econômica da década de 2000 que foi menos severa. Em seguida, usando 
estimativas a nível de Estado das elasticidades entre as medidas das receitas e despesas e as taxas de 
pobreza nos distritos foi estimado se mais mudanças na distribuição dos ingressos estaduais, locais 
ou de renda federal contribui para mudanças no total das despesas correntes e se estas contribuições 
contribuíram a alterações durante a recente recessão.  
Palavras-chave: financiamento escolar; estabilização fiscal; recessão; pobreza. 
Introduction 
The economic downturn’s effect on state school finance systems was unlike previous 
downturns in the early 1990s and early 2000s in that it a) involved a greater loss of taxable income in 
many states, thus greater loss to state general fund revenues, b) also involved a substantial collapse 
of housing markets and related reduction or at least leveling of growth of taxable property wealth 
(Dadayan, 2012), c) but also involved a substantial infusion of federal “fiscal stabilization” aid to fill 
holes in state general aid formulas (Sciarra, Farrie, & Baker, 2010). Unfortunately, however, that 
federal aid infusion was short-lived and many states, within two years, were left with persistent aid 
gaps in their general aid formulas.  
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The economic downturn also ushered in a new era of austerity rhetoric among state 
politicians, across blue and red states and on both sides of the political aisle, at least by formal party 
delineation.  In the face of recent (2014) legal challenges to New York’s school funding formula, 
Democratic Governor Andrew Cuomo proclaimed:  
“We spend more than any other state in the country,” he said. “It ain’t about the 
money. It’s about how you spend it – and the results.”1  
Florida Governor Rick Scott, in justifying his 2011 cuts to the state’s education budget, remarked: 
“We’re spending a lot of money on education, and when you look at the results, it’s 
not great.”2 
In Ohio, Robert Sommers, chief education advisor to Governor Tom Kasich declared: 
“In the last decade, we've spent more money but have not gotten any better result.”3  
And in an interview with New Jersey’s Governor Chris Christie, the Wall Street Journal reported: 
“According to Mr. Christie, New Jersey taxpayers are spending $22,000 per student 
in the Newark school system, yet less than a third of these students graduate, proving 
that more money isn't the answer to better performance.”4 
The ongoing press for austerity in state and local finance systems means that the cuts to state school 
finance systems inflicted during the downturn are less likely to be immediately restored as the 
economy rebounds.  The cuts of the economic downturn may, as a result, be permanent. The most 
recently available federal data on district level finances run through school year 2010-11, giving us 
some glimpse into the impact, across states of the economic downturn which began around 2008. 
The goal of this study is to evaluate the effects of the recession on equity of state school funding 
systems with respect to child poverty concentrations. In addition, the goal is to determine the 
relative role of state and local revenue sources, their amounts and distributions over time, at 
influencing changes in school funding equity over time.  
Do School Finance Reforms Matter? 
Over the past several decades, many states have pursued substantive changes to their state 
school finance systems, while others have not. Some reforms have come and gone. Some reforms 
have been stimulated by judicial pressure resulting from state constitutional challenges and others 
have been initiated by legislatures. In an evaluation of judicial involvement in school finance and 
resulting reforms from 1971 to 1996, Murray, Evans and Schwab (1998) found that “court ordered 
finance reform reduced within-state inequality in spending by 19 to 34 percent. Successful litigation 
reduced inequality by raising spending in the poorest districts while leaving spending in the richest 
districts unchanged, thereby increasing aggregate spending on education. Reform led states to fund 
additional spending through higher state taxes” (p. 789). 
Evaluating whether state school finance systems, or reforms to those systems lead to 
increases in spending generally, or targeted to children from economically disadvantaged 
backgrounds is of little relevance in the absence of evidence supporting effectiveness of such 
reforms.   There exists an increasing body of evidence that substantive and sustained state school 
finance reforms matter for improving both the level and distribution of short term and long run 
student outcomes. A few studies have attempted to tackle school finance reforms broadly applying 
multi-state analyses over time. Card and Payne (2002) found “evidence that equalization of spending 
1 http://blogs.wsj.com/metropolis/2014/02/11/cuomo-on-education-funding-lawsuit-it-aint-about-the-money/  
2 http://blogs.orlandosentinel.com/news_politics/2011/10/scott-anthropology-and-journalism-dont-pay-and-neither-
do-capes.html 
3 http://www.norwalkreflector.com/content/deal-it-schools-can-adjust-cuts-kasich-education-official-tells-lawmakers 
4 http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303348504575184120546772244.html 
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levels leads to a narrowing of test score outcomes across family background groups” (p. 49). 
Jackson, Johnson and Persico (2014) use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to 
evaluate long term outcomes of children exposed to court-ordered school finance reforms, based on 
matching PSID records to childhood school districts for individuals born between 1955 and 1985 
and followed up through 2011. They find that the “Effects of a 20% increase in school spending are 
large enough to reduce disparities in outcomes between children born to poor and non-­‐poor families 
by at least two-­‐thirds,” and further that “A 1% increase in per-­‐pupil spending increases adult wages 
by 1% for children from poor families” (p. 42). 
Figlio (2004) explains that the influence of state school finance reforms on student outcomes 
is perhaps better measured within states over time, explaining that national studies of the type 
attempted by Card and Payne confront problems of a) the enormous diversity in the nature of state 
aid reform plans, and b) the paucity of national level student performance data. Most recent peer 
reviewed studies of state school finance reforms have applied longitudinal analyses within specific 
states. And several such studies provide compelling evidence of the potential positive effects of 
school finance reforms. Roy (2011) published an analysis of the effects of Michigan’s 1990s school 
finance reforms which led to a significant leveling up for previously low-spending districts. Roy, 
whose analyses measure both whether the policy resulted in changes in funding and who was affected, 
found that “Proposal A was quite successful in reducing interdistrict spending disparities. There was 
also a significant positive effect on student performance in the lowest-spending districts as measured 
in state tests” (p. 137). Similarly, Papke (2001), also evaluating Michigan school finance reforms 
from the 1990s, found that “increases in spending have nontrivial, statistically significant effects on 
math test pass rates, and the effects are largest for schools with initially poor performance” (Papke, 
2001, p. 821).5 Deke (2003) evaluated “leveling up” of funding for very-low-spending districts in 
Kansas, following a 1992 lower court threat to overturn the funding formula (without formal ruling 
to that effect). The Deke article found that a 20% increase in spending was associated with a 5 
percent increase in the likelihood of students going on to postsecondary education (p. 275). 
Three studies of Massachusetts school finance reforms from the 1990s find similar results. 
The first, a non-peer-reviewed report by Downes, Zabel, and Ansel (2009) explored, in combination, 
the influence on student outcomes of accountability reforms and changes to school spending. It 
found that “Specifically, some of the research findings show how education reform has been 
successful in raising the achievement of students in the previously low-spending districts” (p. 5). The 
second study, an NBER working paper by Guryan (2001), focused more specifically on the 
redistribution of spending resulting from changes to the state school finance formula. It found that 
“increases in per-pupil spending led to significant increases in math, reading, science, and social 
studies test scores for 4th- and 8th-grade students. The magnitudes imply a $1,000 increase in per-
pupil spending leads to about a third to a half of a standard-deviation increase in average test scores. 
It is noted that the state aid driving the estimates is targeted to under-funded school districts, which 
may have atypical returns to additional expenditures” (p. 1).6 The most recent, by Nguyin-Hoang & 
5 In a separate study, Leuven and colleagues (2007) attempted to isolate specific effects of increases to at-risk funding on 
at risk pupil outcomes, but did not find any positive effects. 
6 While this paper remains an unpublished working paper, the advantage of Guryan’s analysis is that he models the 
expected changes in funding at the local level as a function of changes to the school finance formula itself, through what 
is called an instrumental variables or two stage least squares approach. Then, Guryan evaluates the extent to which these 
policy induced variations in local funding are associated with changes in student outcomes. Across several model 
specifications, Guryan finds increased outcomes for students at Grade 4 but not grade 8. A counter study by the Beacon 
Hill Institute suggest that reduced class size and/or increased instructional spending either has no effect on or actually 
worsens student outcomes (Jaggia & Vachharajani, 2004).  
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Yinger (2014) also found that “changes in the state education aid following the education reform 
resulted in significantly higher student performance” (p.297).    
Downes had conducted earlier studies of Vermont school finance reforms in the late 1990s 
(Act 60). In a 2004 book chapter, Downes noted “All of the evidence cited in this paper supports 
the conclusion that Act 60 has dramatically reduced dispersion in education spending and has done 
this by weakening the link between spending and property wealth. Further, the regressions presented 
in this paper offer some evidence that student performance has become more equal in the post-Act 
60 period. And no results support the conclusion that Act 60 has contributed to increased dispersion 
in performance” (p. 312).7 Most recently, Hyman (2013) also found positive effects of Michigan 
school finance reforms in the 1990s, but raised some concerns regarding the distribution of those 
effects. Hyman found that much of the increase was targeted to schools serving fewer low-income 
children. But, the study did find that students exposed to an additional “12%, more spending per 
year during grades four through seven experienced a 3.9 percentage point increase in the probability 
of enrolling in college, and a 2.5 percentage point increase in the probability of earning a degree” (p. 
1). 
  Indeed, this point is not without some controversy, much of which is easily discarded. 
Second-hand references to dreadful failures following massive infusions of new funding can often 
be traced to methodologically inept, anecdotal tales of desegregation litigation in Kansas City, 
Missouri, or court-ordered financing of urban districts in New Jersey (see Baker & Welner, 2011).8 
Hanushek and Lindseth (2009) use a similar anecdote-driven approach in which they dedicate a 
chapter of a book to proving that court-ordered school funding reforms in New Jersey, Wyoming, 
Kentucky, and Massachusetts resulted in few or no measurable improvements. However, these 
conclusions are based on little more than a series of graphs of student achievement on the National 
Assessment of Educational Progress in 1992 and 2007 and an untested assertion that, during that 
period, each of the four states infused substantial additional funds into public education in response 
to judicial orders.9 Greene and Trivitt (2008) present a study in which they claim to show that court 
                                                
7 Two additional studies of school finance reforms in New Jersey also merit some attention in part because they directly 
refute findings of Hanushek and Lindseth and of the earlier Cato study and do so with more rigorous and detailed 
methods. The first, by Alex Resch (2008) of the University of Michigan (doctoral dissertation in economics), explored in 
detail the resource allocation changes during the scaling up period of school finance reform in New Jersey. Resch found 
evidence suggesting that New Jersey Abbott districts “directed the added resources largely to instructional personnel” (p. 
1) such as additional teachers and support staff. She also concluded that this increase in funding and spending improved 
the achievement of students in the affected school districts. Looking at the statewide 11th grade assessment (“the only 
test that spans the policy change”), she found: “that the policy improves test scores for minority students in the affected 
districts by one-fifth to one-quarter of a standard deviation” (p. 1). Goertz and Weiss (2009) also evaluated the effects of 
New Jersey school finance reforms, but did not attempt a specific empirical test of the relationship between funding 
level and distributional changes and outcome changes. Thus, their findings are primarily descriptive. Goertz and Weiss 
explain that on state assessments achievement gaps closed substantially between 1999 and 2007, the period over which 
Abbott funding was most significantly scaled up.  Goertz and Weiss further explain: “State Assessments: In 1999 the gap 
between the Abbott districts and all other districts in the state was over 30 points. By 2007 the gap was down to 19 
points, a reduction of 11 points or 0.39 standard deviation units. The gap between the Abbott districts and the high-
wealth districts fell from 35 to 22 points. Meanwhile performance in the low-, middle-, and high-wealth districts 
essentially remained parallel during this eight-year period” (Figure 3, p. 23). 
8 Two reports from Cato Institute are illustrative (Ciotti, 1998; Coate & VanDerHoff, 1999).    
9 That is, the authors merely assert that these states experienced large infusions of funding, focused on low income and 
minority students, within the time period identified. They necessarily assume that, in all other states which serve as a 
comparison basis, similar changes did not occur. Yet they validate neither assertion. Baker and Welner (2011) explain 
that Hanushek and Lindseth failed to even measure whether substantive changes had occurred to the level or 
distribution of school funding as well as when and for how long. In New Jersey, for example, infusion of funding 
occurred from 1998 to 2003 (or 2005), thus Hanushek and Lindseth’s window includes 6 years on the front end where 
little change occurred (When?). Kentucky reforms had largely faded by the mid to late 1990s, yet Hanushek and Lindseth 
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ordered school finance reforms led to no substantive improvements in student outcomes. However, 
the authors test only whether the presence of a court order is associated with changes in outcomes, 
and never once measure whether substantive school finance reforms followed the court order, but 
still express the conclusion that court order funding increases had no effect. In equally problematic 
analysis, Neymotin (2010) set out to show that massive court ordered infusions of funding in Kansas 
following Montoy v. Kansas led to no substantive improvements in student outcomes. However, 
Neymotin evaluated changes in school funding from 1997 to 2006, but the first additional funding 
infused following the January 2005 supreme court decision occurred in the 2005-06 school year, the 
end point of Neymotin’s outcome data.   
On balance, it is safe to say that a sizeable and growing body of rigorous empirical literature 
validates that state school finance reforms can have substantive, positive effects on student 
outcomes, including reductions in outcome disparities or increases in overall outcome levels. 
Further, it stands to reason that if positive changes to school funding have positive effects on short 
and long run outcomes both in terms of level and distribution, then negative changes to school 
funding likely have negative effects on student outcomes. Thus it is critically important to 
understand the impact of the recent recession on state school finance systems, the effects on long 
term student outcomes being several years down the line.  It is also important to understand the 
features of state school finance systems including balance of revenue sources that may make these 
systems particularly susceptible to economic downturn.  
How Should We Measure School Finance Reform? 
Historically, school finance equity analysis involved a) assessing variance in measures of per 
pupil spending and revenue and b) assessing the extent to which that variance is associated with 
measures of local wealth and income (Berne & Stiefel, 1984). Policy emphasis was on reducing the 
variance in spending inputs to schooling generally and disrupting the relationship between local 
taxable property wealth, family income and spending (fiscal neutrality) in particular.  Commonly 
used measures of variance include ranges, range ratios and coefficients of variation. Commonly used 
measures of fiscal neutrality included correlations and regression coefficients between wealth, 
income and per pupil spending measures.  These measures still find their way into many reports of 
school funding equity including Education Week’s Quality Counts.10 
A major shortcoming of traditional equity indicators is that they fail to parse the 
“inequitable” variations and “equitable” variations in per pupil resources. Those “equitable” 
variations are variations in resources intended to accommodate differences in educational needs and 
costs, including differences in student populations, labor costs and such factors as population 
measure post reform effects in 2007 (When?). Further, in New Jersey, funding was infused into approximately 30 
specific districts, but Hanushek and Lindseth explore overall changes to outcomes among low-income children and 
minorities using NAEP data, where some of these children attend the districts receiving additional support but many did 
not (Who?). In short the slipshod comparisons made by Hanushek and Lindseth provide no reasonable basis for 
asserting either the success or failures of state school finance reforms.  Hanushek (2006) goes so far as to title the book 
“How School Finance Lawsuits Exploit Judges’ Good Intentions and Harm Our Children.” The premise that additional 
funding for schools often leveraged toward class size reduction, additional course offerings or increased teacher salaries, 
causes harm to children is, on its face, absurd. And the book which implies as much in its title never once validates that 
such reforms ever do cause harm. Rather, the title is little more than a manipulative attempt to convince the non-critical 
spectator who never gets past the book’s cover to fear that school finance reforms might somehow harm children. The 
book also includes two examples of a type of analysis that occurred with some frequency in the mid-2000s which also 
had the intent of showing that school funding doesn’t matter. These studies would cherry pick anecdotal information on 
either or both a) poorly funded schools that have high outcomes or b) well-funded schools that have low outcomes (see 
Evers & Clopton, 2006, Walber, 2006). 
10 http://www.edweek.org/media/16qc-schoolfinancec1.pdf  
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sparsity and economies of scale. “Inequitable” variations are those that occur without regard for 
needs and costs, and may include those variations in resources that are largely a function of local 
wealth and fiscal capacity. As commonly applied, traditional equity measures fail to sort out 
equitable variation from inequitable variation, often leading to erroneous conclusions.11  
 Conceptions of equity in school finance have evolved over the decades, and so to have 
funding formula mechanisms for improving equity and methods for evaluating those efforts (Baker 
& Green, 2008, 2014; Baker, Sciarra, & Farrie, 2012; Duncombe & Yinger, 2008). The most 
significant shift has been from evaluating equity in terms of nominal dollar inputs to schooling, to 
viewing equity in terms of providing children regardless of their educational settings or personal 
backgrounds, equal opportunity to achieve common outcome goals (Baker & Green, 2008, 2014). 
Achieving common outcome goals requires appropriate differentiation of spending inputs to 
account for differences in the costs of achieving those outcome goals (Duncombe & Yinger, 2008). 
Among the more commonly acknowledged factors influencing the costs of achieving common 
outcomes are district or school characteristics such as economies of scale, population sparsity and 
local labor market conditions, and student population characteristics such as local concentrations of 
child poverty and numbers of children who are limited in their English language proficiency or have 
specific disabilities (Duncombe & Yinger, 2008).  State school finance systems, and in some cases 
local district budgeting models have evolved to include factors to account for these cost differences. 
But these models are necessarily a result of political deliberations and rarely fully accommodate 
differences in costs of serving needy children, and often include numerous political tradeoffs to 
achieve adoption (Baker, 2009; Baker & Green, 2005). 
Ideally, to evaluate whether a state school finance system provides for equal opportunity to 
achieve desired outcomes, one would know or be able to estimate with reasonable precision, the 
costs of achieving common outcomes across children, schools and districts. One could then use 
these cost adjustments to evaluate whether actual spending is sufficiently adjusted. Others have 
applied this approach to state specific analyses (Duncombe & Yinger, 1998; Reschovsky & Imazeki, 
2004).  But this approach is implausible to apply across states due to vast differences in state 
outcome standards and the assessments by which they are measured. Adoption of common 
standards and assessments may, down the line, increase our ability to estimate cross-state cost 
variation of achieving common standards (see Baker, Taylor, & Vedlitz, 2008).  
Alternatively, given the lack of common outcome measures, one might regress per pupil 
spending as a function of cost factors to determine whether spending variation across schools or 
districts varies at all with respect to cost factors. Baker, Sciarra and Farrie (2009, 2012, 2014) use a 
regression based approach to determine the extent that state and local revenues per pupil vary, 
across districts, across states, with respect to child poverty concentrations, controlling for 
competitive wage variation, economies of scale and population density. Others have applied similar 
approaches to evaluate the sensitivity of school site budgets to student characteristics (Ajwad, 2006; 
Baker 2009, 2012; Chambers, Levin, & Shambaugh 2010; Levin et al., 2013). The goal of these 
regression-based methods is to determine the relationship between variation in poverty 
concentrations across schools or districts and availability of financial resources, controlling for 
exogenous cost pressures. That is, how much more or less funding is available in higher versus lower 
poverty settings, after accounting for differences in costs? 
                                                
11 For example, Education Week’s Quality Counts report finds greater variation in per pupil spending in New Jersey than 
in New York, and thus assigns New Jersey a lower grade for equity. But as our models show, New Jersey’s district 
spending variation is a direct result of targeting additional funds to higher need districts and New York’s lack of 
variation is a function of not targeting additional resources to higher need districts. 
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Goals of this Study 
The goal of this study is to evaluate the effects of the recent recession on equity of state 
school funding systems with respect to child poverty concentrations, statistically evaluated using 
models comparable those estimated in Baker, Sciarra and Farrie (2010, 2012, 2014).  That is, the goal 
is to evaluate the overall level and relative progressiveness of various revenue components of local 
public school districts and of current operating expenditures.  As explained in Is School Funding Fair, a 
progressive system is one where combined state and local revenue per pupil is positively associated 
with poverty concentration – that is, one where higher poverty concentration districts have 
marginally more state and local revenue per pupil than do lower poverty districts.   
In addition to evaluating funding fairness overall, this study attempts to get under the hood 
of funding fairness across states, determining which revenue sources more strongly influence shifts 
in funding fairness over time. Prior reports have indicated that the amount or share of state aid 
allocated is not always a strong determinant of funding fairness, though it seems that increased state 
support should lead to improved fairness (Baker & Corcoran, 2012). Baker and Corcoran (2012) 
showed that state school finance systems often allocate state aid in ways that reinforces or even 
exacerbates inequities.  
Questions addressed in this paper are as follows: 
1) What is the interplay, over time and across states, between state aid and local revenues?
a. Does that interplay differ for lower and higher poverty districts within states?
b. Does that interplay differ during the recent economic downturn when compared
with the complete panel (1993 – 2011) or earlier downturn (1999 to 2003)
c. Are there important lagged structures to that interplay?
2) How does the level and distribution of federal, state and local revenue with respect to
poverty influence the distribution of current operating expenditures per pupil with
respect to poverty across districts within states?
a. Does that relationship differ during the recent economic downturn when
compared with the complete panel (1993 – 2011) or earlier downturn (1999 to
2003) 
b. Are there important lagged structures to that interplay?
3) How many states saw substantive declines in funding fairness from 2009-2011? And to
what magnitude?
I begin by evaluating the interplay between levels of federal, state and local revenues across states 
over time, exploring the extent to which state aid increases are accompanied by local revenue 
decreases and whether local revenues increase in response to state aid decreases. I explore whether 
these shifts occur differently a) during different recession and growth periods and b) across higher 
versus lower poverty school districts.  I also test the possibility that changes in revenues by source 
have lagged effects. For example, that state aid cuts not only in current but prior recent years, lead to 
increases in local revenue, which may compromise equity.  
Next, I explore the progressiveness/regressiveness of various revenue sources, across states 
over time. I evaluate whether and to what extent changes to the progressiveness of federal, state or 
local revenues affect changes to the progressiveness of current operating expenditures across school 
districts within states. I also explore whether the relative influence of each revenue source on 
spending “fairness” differs over different time periods.  That is, across states and for each state, 
which revenues seem to most strongly influence fairness? Do increases in local revenue levels and 
the typical patterns of unfairness of local revenues drive increased inequity? Do increases in state aid 
coupled with increases in progressive targeting in state aid drive changes in spending fairness. Again, 
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as well as characterizing contemporaneous (same year) changes, I explore lagged effects.  I conclude 
with a summary of states that have experienced declining funding fairness through the most recent 
economic recession.  
Methods 
Models herein use annual data on local public school district revenue and expenditure from 
the U.S. Census Bureau’s fiscal survey of local governments (F-33) along with annual data on school 
and student population characteristics from a) the National Center for Education Statistics Common 
Core of Data, public education agency universe survey and public school universe survey and b) the 
U.S. Census Bureau special tabulation Small Area (school district) Income and Poverty Estimates.  
Finally, I use the education comparable wage index (Taylor & Fowler, 2006) to account for macro 
level differences in labor market variation in wages across local public school districts within states. 
Specifics on data sources and years, including imputations are provided in Appendix A.12  
Estimating Models of the Interplay between District Level Revenue Sources 
For the first analysis, to discern the relationship between local, state and federal revenues 
and how that relationship varies across lower and higher poverty local public school districts within 
states, I estimate models to a 19-year panel of district level data. The goal of these models is to 
characterize the patterns of relationship in the same year between local tax revenues and state aid.  I 
test the relationship between the natural log of local tax revenue per pupil and state aid per pupil 
(natural logged) and federal aid per pupil (natural log).  
Eq1: LREVsdt = f(STAIDsdt  x STATE, FEDAIDsdt x STATE, Enrollmentsdt, ECWIsdt) 
Where LREV is local revenue per pupil for each state (s), district (d) and year (t), STAID is state aid 
per pupil for each state (s), district (d) and year (t), and FEDAID is federal aid per pupil for each 
state (s), district (d) and year (t).  The model includes controls for changes in enrollment (district 
level) and regional variation in competitive wages (ECWI).   
I estimate fixed effects models of within district revenue changes over time. That is, within 
districts over time, do changes in federal or state aid coincide with changes in local revenue? 
Interaction terms are used to generate state specific estimates of local tax revenue changes in 
response to changes in state aid.  I report these fixed effects estimates for the entire panel 1993 to 
2011 and for two separate time periods of economic downturn as reflected in significant dips in tax 
revenues – from 2001 to 2005 and from 2007 to 2011. 
The expectation is that increased state aid provides local public school districts the 
opportunity to either reduce local effort or at least to increase local effort more slowly.  It is also 
assumed that the ability to raise additional local revenue depends on local fiscal capacity and that 
districts serving higher need populations may have lower local fiscal capacity. However, it is also 
likely that given school district organizational differences and varied policy constraints including 
12 My intent here is account for exogenous wage variation which broadly affects labor costs (the largest component of 
school spending). Additionally, the ECWI includes an inflation component and is available annually from 1997 to 2011. 
An alternative approach yielding largely similar results involves including labor market dummy variables such that slopes 
of revenues with respect to poverty are characterized within labor markets. Other wage adjustment conceptions, like hedonic 
wage models, which attempt to adjust at the school district level to account for working conditions are less appropriate 
here for a variety of reasons, most notably that we are trying to capture separately the extent to which state and local 
revenues are sensitive to poverty, wherein compensating differentials are a portion of poverty related costs. We prefer to 
retain these differentials, to the extent they exist, in the poverty slope as part of our measure of cross district equity.  
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differently imposed tax and expenditure limits, local responses with respect to variation in poverty 
across districts will vary across states. In some states, more than others, higher poverty districts may 
be hamstrung and unable to raise additional local revenues to compensate for lagging state aid, 
which in turn may exacerbate inequities in periods of state aid reduction.  
To lay groundwork for understanding cross state variation in these relationships, I test the 
relationship between local tax revenue and state and federal revenues across states for a) all districts 
statewide, b) high poverty districts (highest quintile within state), and c) low poverty districts (lowest 
quintile within state). To the extent that the negative coefficient between state aid and local revenue 
is greater for less poor districts (stronger local revenue response to state aid reduction), cuts to state 
aid may be more harmful to poorer districts.  
Generating State Level Predicted Spending Levels & Progressiveness Ratios 
The next step is to generate “fairness” or “progressiveness” indicators for each state for each 
year as well as predicted revenue and spending levels for each state and year, holding constant other 
factors.  The progressiveness indicators and predicted values are estimated for current expenditures 
per pupil, for combined state and local revenues per pupil and for each revenue component (state, 
local, federal).  To generate the fairness indicators, I estimate the following regression for each 
individual year of the 19-year district level panel.  
 
Eq2: Revenues (or Spending) per Pupildst = f(Scaledst, Competitive WageLt, State x Povertydst) 
 
In each case, the revenue or expenditure measure is expressed in per pupil terms (and natural 
log), for each school district (d) in state (s) in year (t) (where approximately 13,000 districts per year 
include complete data).  Economies of scale is expressed in enrollment categories to capture a step 
down effect in spending variation as a function of district enrollment size, where districts enrolling 
over 2,000 pupils are considered to be of efficient scale (see Andrews, Duncombe & Yinger, 2002). 
Competitive wage refers to the Taylor competitive wage index13 which is applied at the labor market 
level to individual districts. And poverty refers to the U.S. Census Small Area Income and Poverty 
Estimates.  
The models are used to generate predicted values of each dependent variable, at 0%, 10%, 
20% and 30% U.S. Census Poverty rates.  The fairness indicator is the ratio of the predicted value at 
30% poverty to the predicted value at 10% poverty, holding constant district size (over 2,000) and 
the competitive wage index at the within year mean. 
 
Eq3: Fairness =  Predicted Value 30% Poverty 
Predicted Value 10% Poverty 
 
The goal is to generate an easily interpreted “slope” of the relationship between a common poverty 
measure and state and local revenues, for reasonable comparison across states. Census poverty rates 
within and across states tend to fall between 0% and 30%, wherein a 30% Census poverty rate 
(under the 100% income threshold for poverty) is often aligned with an 80% to 90% rate of children 
qualified for free or reduced priced lunch under the National School Lunch Program.14 Distribution 
of district poverty rates in Appendix B.  
                                                
13 http://bush.tamu.edu/research/faculty/Taylor_CWI/  
14 For a state by state mapping of Census Poverty rates to subsidized lunch rates, see Appendix A: 
http://schoolfundingfairness.org/National_Report_Card_2014.pdf 
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Predicted revenue or spending levels per pupil are the predicted values for each dependent 
measure at 10% Census Poverty, holding constant district size (over 2,000) and the competitive 
wage index at the within year mean. Thus, trends are reported in current (not constant) dollars. I take 
this step in part because of the difficulty in identifying the “right” deflator for public service 
expenditure and the deceptive result that follow – either that education spending has or has not 
risen with respect to inflation, depending on the chosen deflator. Rather, the goal herein is to 
evaluate when and where the trends change, whether expressed in constant or current dollars.  
The end result of this step of the analysis is a 19 year panel of a) predicted revenue and 
spending levels at 10% poverty and b) fairness ratios for each revenue or spending measure. With 
this state level panel, I am able to evaluate long term trends in revenues and spending and to 
evaluate which revenue sources, by level or fairness, to determine which are the strongest drivers of 
current expenditure fairness across local public school districts.  
Determining the Relative Influence of Revenue Sources on Spending Equity 
The next step is to use the 50 state (+ DC) 19-year panel of revenue and spending level and 
fairness indicators to evaluate the drivers of spending fairness over time.  To conduct this 
evaluation, I estimate the following model:  
Eq4: CUREXPP_fst = f(LREV_fst, STAID_fst, FEDAID_fst, LREV_lst, STAID_lst, 
FEDAID_lst) 
Where CUREXPP_f, LREV_f, STAID_f and FEDAID_f are the fairness ratios (f) for each funding 
measure and LREV_l, STAID_l and FEDAID_L are the predicted revenue levels (“l” at 10% 
poverty) for each measure in state “s” at time “t.” 
For exploratory purposes, I estimate models of between state difference (between effects), 
within state over time differences (fixed effects) and random effects (combining the two).  The fixed 
effects model is of primary interest and tells us whether year-over-year changes in levels of revenue 
by source, or fairness of those revenues are associated with changes in spending fairness. That is, do 
increases in state aid or local revenue increase fairness? Does increased targeting of state aid by 
poverty (fairness of state aid) lead to increased spending fairness as one would expect? Finally, are 
the fixed effects different in the most recent economic downturn than a) over the entire 19 year 
panel or b) over the previous economic slowdown of the early 2000s.15 The between state model 
reveals the extent to which states with higher levels of specific revenues or more fair distributions of 
revenues by source have more fair spending distributions.  
Findings & Discussion 
I begin with an overview of the interplay between federal, state and local revenue sources over 
time across states from 1993 to 2011. I also report the within state fixed effects, over time between 
changes in state aid and changes in local revenue, for all districts, high poverty districts and low 
poverty districts.  Next, I summarize predicted spending levels and trends in funding fairness 
(current spending and state and local revenue). Next, I evaluate first nationally and then by state the 
relationship between revenue changes over time and spending fairness changes over time, within 
which I also explore whether the most recent economic down turn exhibits different patterns than 
15 See Figure2: http://www.rockinst.org/pdf/government_finance/2012-07-16-Recession_Local_%20Property_Tax.pdf 
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the full panel, or prior downturns.  I conclude with a summary of states experiencing the most 
significant declines in spending progressiveness over the period from 2009 to 2011.  
The Interplay between Revenue Sources 
Figure 1 summarizes trends in federal, state and local revenue, based on predicted values for 
these revenue sources for scale efficient districts in an average cost labor market with 10% children 
in poverty. Notably, partly because these estimates are for districts with relatively low poverty level, 
the role of federal aid is relatively small. For several states, one can see a small bump in federal aid 
around 2009, which is likely driven by the introduction of Fiscal Stabilization Aid under the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. Fiscal stabilization aid was meant to substitute for lost 
state general fund revenues used to support state general aid formulas.  
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Figure 1. Time Trends in State Aid, Federal Aid and Local Revenue 
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Figure 1 (cont.’d). Time Trends in State Aid, Federal Aid and Local Revenue
In many states, like New York and Kansas, one can visually observe that when state aid 
growth slows, local revenue increases. The two oscillate back and forth as counterbalancing forces. 
In some states, more abrupt shifts are apparent and in some cases those abrupt shifts are easily 
Education Policy Analysis Archives  Vol. 22 No. 91 14 
explained by policy changes. In both New Hampshire and Vermont, local revenues were at specific 
points in time, reclassified as state revenues. Statewide property taxation requirements were adopted 
and some revenue from those statewide property taxes shared. The reclassification is revealed as an 
abrupt switch in New Hampshire and more than one switch in Vermont. Similarly, in Michigan in 
the 1990s, the state opted to aggressively replace local property tax effort with state aid raised 
through a mix of sin and sales taxes. 
Table 1 summarizes the fixed effect estimates of local revenue response to changes in state 
aid, for all districts, high poverty districts and low poverty districts by state and time period. States 
are ranked from top to bottom in the table by strongest local revenue (counterbalancing) response 
to weakest for the complete time frame, all districts. States with dramatic, anomalous revenue 
reclassifications or policy induced substitutions top the list but do not reflect the more usual 
interplay between state and local revenues. States with subtler counterbalancing patterns of local 
revenue response including Wisconsin, Kansas, Texas and New York reveal more typical response 
patterns.  Interestingly, in Kansas over time, low poverty districts have not generally responded to 
decreased state aid with increased local revenue, or increased state aid with decreased local revenue. 
This effect may be in part a result of the relatively small share of funding received by these districts 
from the state and may also be in part a function of strict revenue caps and larger shares of low 
poverty districts constrained by those caps. The response of higher poverty districts in Kansas is 
more expected, until the most recent downturn, where they too do not, or are unable to respond. 
One might then expect that if aid was substantively cut during this most recent downturn, inequities 
will have increased (or fairness decreased).  
Overall, there appear to be many cases for high poverty districts during the 2007-11 
economic downturn where local revenues responded in the same rather than opposite direction of 
state aid and in most cases that direction was downward. That local revenue growth either flattened 
out, or even declined while state revenue declined.  During the period from 2007-2011, we saw the 
largest number of states where low poverty districts had local revenue changes moving in the 
opposite direction of state aid and the smallest number of states where high poverty districts showed 
the same inverse relationship. One implication of this finding is that the period from 2007-2011, 
dominated by cuts rather than increases to state aid, may also have led to unprecedented reductions 
in total resources to high poverty districts.  
Table 1. 
Within State Fixed Effects of Local Revenue on State Aid (Fixed Effect) 
All Years 2001-2005 2007-2011 
All 
Low High 
All 
Low High 
All 
Low High 
Poverty Poverty Poverty Poverty Poverty Poverty 
Count of  
25 25 30 25 21 27 28 31 21 
Negative Coefficients 
Vermont -0.911 -0.821 -1.169 -1.705 -1.353 -2.307 -0.898 -0.892 -0.586 
Arkansas -0.585 -0.587 -0.61 -0.318 -0.419 -0.215 0.133 0.137 0.13 
Minnesota -0.489 -0.452 -0.66 -0.556 -1.039 -0.816 0.093 0.144 0.139 
Michigan -0.449 -0.473 -0.437 -0.064 -0.098 -0.103 -0.02 -0.025 -0.133 
Idaho -0.41 -0.138 -0.374 0.279 0.236 -0.646 0.259 -0.306 0.651 
Oregon -0.371 -0.223 -0.331 -0.085 -0.111 -0.083 -0.073 -0.166 0.298 
Alaska -0.203 -0.047 -0.178 -0.002 0.243 -0.053 -0.278 -0.241 0.063 
Wisconsin -0.201 -0.19 -0.179 -0.186 -0.202 -0.189 -0.174 -0.112 -0.211 
Kansas -0.183 0.091 -0.153 -0.173 0.271 -0.339 -0.027 -0.092 0.02 
Indiana -0.179 -0.044 -0.255 1.514 1.912 0.896 -0.36 -0.154 -0.485 
South Dakota -0.153 -0.135 -0.152 -0.018 -0.084 -0.183 -0.152 -0.005 0.015 
Texas -0.13 -0.109 -0.152 -0.336 -0.359 -0.334 -0.257 -0.159 -0.378 
New Hampshire -0.129 -0.14 -0.148 -0.304 0.154 -0.165 0.061 -0.243 0.116 
Nebraska -0.119 -0.065 -0.08 0.039 0.121 -0.065 0.004 -0.021 -0.023 
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Table 1. (cont.’d) 
Within State Fixed Effects of Local Revenue on State Aid (Fixed Effect) 
All Years 2001-2005 2007-2011 
All 
Low High 
All 
Low High 
All 
Low High 
Poverty Poverty Poverty Poverty Poverty Poverty 
Count of  
25 25 30 25 21 27 28 31 21 
Negative Coefficients 
Colorado -0.099 -0.064 -0.129 -0.006 -0.007 -0.018 -0.079 -0.056 0.076 
New York -0.088 -0.13 -0.097 0.145 0.103 0.157 0.026 -0.014 0.215 
Massachusetts -0.075 -0.064 -0.041 -0.127 -0.126 0.027 -0.265 -0.17 -0.285 
Rhode Island -0.062 0.033 -0.264 -0.039 0.19 -0.622 0.126 0.072 0.838 
Pennsylvania -0.045 0.011 -0.136 0.224 0.283 0.156 -0.177 -0.102 -0.277 
New Jersey -0.044 -0.033 -0.146 0.066 0.015 0.059 -0.006 -0.032 -0.035 
Virginia -0.043 -0.033 -0.159 -0.324 -0.384 -0.18 0.062 0.427 -0.001 
Utah -0.032 -0.002 -0.075 -1.347 -2.437 -0.014 -0.076 -0.007 -0.533 
Arizona -0.023 -0.007 -0.028 -0.026 0 -0.176 -0.119 -0.08 -0.148 
Ohio -0.022 -0.044 -0.04 0.004 -0.024 -0.005 0.013 0.007 0.051 
Connecticut -0.012 -0.074 0.05 0.021 0.022 0.031 -0.004 0.044 -0.023 
West Virginia 0.001 -0.078 0.047 -0.266 -0.193 -0.35 0.211 -0.081 0.286 
Nevada 0.005 0.319 0.062 -0.038 -0.109 0.034 -0.724 -0.091 0.198 
Maryland 0.006 -0.045 -0.03 -0.01 -0.111 0.131 0.115 0.028 0.103 
North Dakota 0.009 0.087 -0.034 0.013 0.201 0.024 -0.224 -0.298 -0.167 
California 0.017 0.033 -0.012 -0.05 0.039 -0.155 0.051 0.038 0.14 
Tennessee 0.022 0.047 0.037 -0.017 0.037 -0.078 -0.251 -0.216 -0.364 
Oklahoma 0.025 0.009 0.098 -0.1 -0.182 -0.042 -0.119 -0.175 0.006 
Montana 0.035 0.081 -0.033 0.175 0.035 0.178 0.018 -0.065 0.106 
Wyoming 0.042 0.064 0.152 0.057 0.209 -0.123 -0.102 -0.049 -0.13 
Illinois 0.047 0.015 0.009 0.047 0.04 0.05 0.138 0.105 0.145 
South Carolina 0.078 -0.073 0.185 -0.22 -0.191 -0.407 -0.079 -0.444 0.209 
Iowa 0.098 0.151 0.117 0.022 0.097 0.024 0.015 0.202 0.087 
Maine 0.102 0.135 -0.013 0.031 0.011 0.066 -0.023 -0.102 -0.084 
North Carolina 0.108 0.436 -0.15 0.347 -0.693 0.382 -0.018 -0.424 0.143 
Washington 0.144 0.26 0.151 -0.154 0.048 -0.155 -0.074 0.1 -0.25 
Florida 0.159 0.111 0.003 0.032 0.099 -0.01 0.229 0.278 0.081 
Kentucky 0.175 0.327 0.095 0.223 0.336 0.163 -0.036 -0.126 0.018 
Missouri 0.208 0.246 0.229 0.158 0.082 0.098 0.174 0.308 0.207 
New Mexico 0.268 0.354 0.25 0.145 0 0.757 0.082 0.052 0.172 
Mississippi 0.274 0.374 0.184 0.16 0.403 0.164 -0.048 0.271 -0.231 
Delaware 0.292 0.178 0.398 0.115 0.181 0.25 -0.056 -0.281 -0.241 
Alabama 0.412 0.415 0.432 0.396 0.451 0.592 0.065 0.19 -0.218 
Louisiana 0.461 0.385 0.437 0.138 -0.151 0.163 0.137 0.354 0.375 
Georgia 0.682 0.69 0.6 0.024 -0.173 0.036 0.101 0.233 0.019 
Note: Figures are coefficients on the relationship between local revenue and state aid from fixed effects panel 
models.  
State Level Spending Progressiveness Ratios 
Figure 2 tracks the fairness ratios for the current spending and state and local revenue 
measures.  The vertical axis in each graph measures the funding fairness ratio, where 1.0 indicates 
that a district with 30% children in poverty would have equal predicted funding to a district with 0% 
poverty. 1.5 means that a district with 30% poverty has 50% more predicted funding than a district 
with 0% poverty, thus a progressively funded system. So when the index is above the 1.0 horizontal 
line, the system is progressive and when the index is below the 1.0 horizontal line, the system is 
regressive.  
As expected in most cases, the current spending fairness index is marginally more 
progressive than the state and local revenue fairness index and in most cases when one declines, the 
other declines and when one rises the other rises.  However, there are some data irregularities which 
appear as shocks. Here, those occur potentially because of error in the measures, and also because 
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some states have particularly small sample sizes (numbers of districts) within year for generating 
estimates. States with few districts or many small districts tend to have more volatile fairness indices 
(Alaska, Delaware, Nevada, Utah, Vermont, Wyoming).  
Among mid-Atlantic states, Pennsylvania and New York remain regressive throughout the 
period. New Jersey starts as a flat system in the 1990s, and climbs toward a significant progressive 
position through about 2006. After that, both spending and revenue fairness in New Jersey drop 
sharply back toward flat distribution (1.0). In the Deep South, Louisiana climbs slowly from 
regressive to progressive funding with substantive increases in funding over time allocated to New 
Orleans area schools in the post Katrina period. Notably, these increases started prior to Katrina. 
Texas revenue gradually fades toward regressiveness over time, and current spending, while 
progressive, fades slowly toward a flat state. Illinois remains regressive throughout the period, much 
like New York and Pennsylvania.  
Perhaps the most consistent long run decline in funding fairness over time occurs in 
Missouri. The apparent progressive distribution in Missouri in the mid-1990s is largely a function of 
desegregation remedies imposed in Kansas City and St. Louis, which were financed primarily 
through forced local tax levy increases in those cities and an income tax surcharge on workers in 
Kansas City (see Green and Baker, 2006). After the U.S. Supreme Court issued its 1995 order in 
Missouri v. Jenkins (Kansas City case) asserting that the lower courts remedies had essentially gone 
too far, funding stagnated in the major urban centers.  
  
  
Figure 2. Time Trends in Spending & Revenue Fairness 
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Figure 1 (cont.’d). Time Trends in Spending & Revenue Fairness 
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The Relative Influence of Revenue Sources on Spending Equity 
Table 2 provides the results of a national panel model of state level data for the 19-year 
period and then for the previous two economic slowdown periods. Models reported in Table 2 
evaluate the relationship between revenue source levels, revenue distributions with respect to 
poverty and current spending fairness. That is, to what extent do increased state, local or federal 
revenues contribute to spending fairness and to what extent do increased targeting of those revenues 
by poverty contribute to spending fairness. The expectation would be that increases in local revenue 
levels would contribute negatively to funding fairness, unless those increases to local revenue levels 
were coupled with increases in local revenue fairness (decreases in local revenue regressiveness). The 
expectation would also be that increases to state or federal revenue levels should lead to increases in 
spending fairness with the bulk of the contribution coming from state aid.  
Of primary interest in Table 2 are the fixed effects estimates of the relationship between 
within state, over time changes in revenue levels and distribution and spending distribution.  Across 
all years we do see that increases in state revenue are positively associated with increases in spending 
fairness (.033, p<.05). We don’t however see that changes in state revenue fairness contribute 
positively to spending fairness. That is, level changes in state revenue, more so than distribution 
changes, are influencing changes in spending fairness.  
We do see that changes to local revenue fairness contribute to spending fairness. That is, this 
direct relationship suggests either or both that as local revenues become more disparate, so too does 
spending, and as local revenues become less disparate so too does spending.  Changes to federal 
revenue fairness (targeting) contribute positively to spending fairness and changes to federal revenue 
levels also contribute to spending fairness. That is, the effects of federal revenue are more consistent 
than those of state revenue at improving spending fairness, and the effects are of greater magnitude. 
The response in spending fairness for any $1 increase in federal aid is greater than the response to 
state aid, but the amount of federal revenue involved is much less.  
During the early 2000s economic slowdown, the role of federal aid remains consistent, but 
state revenue increases are no longer positively associated with spending fairness increases. Some 
especially peculiar shifts occur for the most recent economic downturn. During this period, shifts in 
the fairness of local revenues are a relatively strong determinant of spending fairness. Again, this 
direct relationship may be operating in either direction. The more likely direction is that affluent 
districts outpaced significantly the local revenue of poorer districts as state aid declined, and these 
differences exacerbated wealth related inequities (reducing spending fairness).  
There is also a direct relationship between state aid level and spending fairness. But, during 
this period state aid was most often cut quite dramatically, meaning that this coefficient likely 
represents the declining spending fairness that resulted from declining state aid. Perhaps most 
interesting is the finding that in the most recent downturn, changes in state aid fairness were 
negatively associated with changes in spending fairness. It may be the case that state aid fairness 
declined with state aid cuts. That is, cuts were levied in greater amounts for higher need, more aid 
dependent districts. It may be that as those cuts were levied, those higher need districts on average 
raised more local revenue to offset the cuts, buffering the equity declines. But other evidence herein 
suggests these efforts to buffer losses may not have worked so well.  
Evaluating the Recessions Impact on State School Finance Systems 19 
Table 2. 
Relationship of Revenue Components to Spending Fairness  
All Years 2001-2005 2007-2011 
BE FE RE BE FE RE BE FE RE 
Fairness Ratio State Revenue -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 * -0.004 * 
Fairness Ratio Local Revenue 0.189 * 0.073 * 0.076 * 0.164 -0.103 -0.043 0.068 0.202 * 0.164 * 
Fairness Ratio Federal Revenue 0.043 * 0.022 * 0.022 * 0.045 * 0.015 * 0.016 * 0.034 * 0.034 * 0.034 *
State Rev PP (ln) 0.006 0.033 * 0.029 * -0.152 -0.057 -0.090 -0.104 0.202 * 0.131 * 
Local Rev PP (ln) -0.029 0.006 -0.002 -0.094 0.000 -0.047 -0.059 0.133 * 0.060 
Federal Rev PP (ln) 0.383 * 0.064 * 0.072 * 0.466 * 0.091 ** 0.148 * 0.234 * 0.091 * 0.101 *
Constant -1.308 0.321 * 0.373 * -0.047 1.106 1.369 * 0.852 -2.488 * -1.312 ** 
within 0.345 0.408 0.407 0.186 0.215 0.207 0.259 0.471 0.464 
between 0.441 0.340 0.359 0.482 0.221 0.410 0.231 0.075 0.116 
overall 0.319 0.310 0.321 0.405 0.211 0.355 0.234 0.129 0.173 
N = 51 x 19 (1993 to 2011)  
BE = Between Effects (between states), FE = Fixed Effects (within state over time), RE = Random Effects 
*p<.05, **p<.10
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Table 3 summarizes, by state, the correlations between the first differenced time series. 
These are simply bivariate correlations across 18 observations (changes between 19 periods) within 
each state. States are ranked from highest to lowest relationship between state aid level changes and 
spending fairness changes. Connecticut and New Jersey both display strong direct relationship 
between state aid increases and spending fairness increase, or vice versa. These states also display a 
strong positive relationship between state aid fairness and spending fairness, and the expected 
inverse relationship between local revenue level and spending fairness.  The implication is that in 
these states, aid is significantly targeted toward at least some very high poverty districts.  
In a number of states, changes in state revenue appear inversely associated with changes in 
spending fairness, suggesting a tendency either of state revenue increases to be targeted to less needy 
districts or state revenue decreases to be targeted to more needy districts.  These findings make 
sense for some states like Missouri that during several years in this panel operated a matching aid 
formula whereby wealthier districts could receive more aid by choosing to raise more local revenue 
and they did. Similarly, states with relatively flat aid formulas, insensitive to either local fiscal capacity 
or student needs, like North Carolina appear to erode equity with aid increases (see Baker and 
Corcoran, 2012).  
Table 3. 
Contemporaneous Correlations with Change in Spending Fairness (first differenced) 
State Change in State Revenue Level 
Change in Local 
Revenue Level 
Change in State 
Revenue Fairness 
Change in Local 
Revenue 
Fairness 
Connecticut 0.744 -0.613 0.683 -0.554 
New Jersey 0.630 -0.283 0.371 -0.299 
Florida 0.600 -0.086 -0.128 0.254 
Iowa 0.578 -0.002 0.771 -0.317 
Maryland 0.521 -0.096 0.549 -0.395 
New York 0.459 -0.241 0.177 0.270 
Wyoming 0.438 -0.524 -0.020 -0.332 
Ohio 0.43 -0.150 0.196 -0.064 
Rhode Island 0.401 -0.135 0.433 -0.16 
Washington 0.401 -0.418 -0.170 0.249 
California 0.400 -0.022 0.095 -0.369 
Arizona 0.360 0.249 0.401 -0.484 
Massachusetts 0.348 0.141 0.600 0.214 
Wisconsin 0.329 -0.313 0.638 -0.497 
Kansas 0.329 -0.030 0.321 -0.197 
Alaska 0.292 -0.735 0.728 -0.323 
Maine 0.241 0.271 0.218 0.287 
New Hampshire 0.238 -0.199 -0.208 0.523 
Nebraska 0.231 -0.321 0.090 0.218 
Georgia 0.201 0.007 0.063 0.133 
Louisiana 0.198 -0.259 0.173 0.389 
Vermont 0.176 -0.341 0.265 0.278 
Texas 0.175 0.133 0.312 -0.397 
Nevada 0.174 0.089 0.361 -0.172 
Minnesota 0.158 -0.020 0.634 -0.120 
Mississippi 0.155 -0.223 -0.133 -0.067 
Michigan 0.149 -0.182 -0.059 0.079 
Virginia 0.138 -0.444 0.042 0.276 
Delaware 0.129 0.281 -0.18 0.183 
Oregon 0.124 -0.089 -0.042 -0.037 
Utah 0.075 0.520 0.033 0.360 
Evaluating the Recessions Impact on State School Finance Systems 21 
Table 3. (cont.’d) 
Contemporaneous Correlations with Change in Spending Fairness (first differenced) 
State Change in State Revenue Level 
Change in Local 
Revenue Level 
Change in State 
Revenue Fairness 
Change in Local 
Revenue 
Fairness 
North Dakota 0.032 -0.048 0.210 -0.289 
West Virginia 0.005 0.215 0.429 -0.158 
South Carolina -0.016 -0.41 0.277 0.299 
New Mexico -0.033 -0.116 -0.157 0.053 
Pennsylvania -0.070 0.093 -0.261 0.547 
Tennessee -0.093 -0.283 0.183 0.478 
Kentucky -0.101 -0.09 0.564 0.051 
Montana -0.168 0.197 0.645 0.166 
Idaho -0.172 0.090 0.613 0.481 
Arkansas -0.192 -0.031 0.191 0.244 
Missouri -0.195 -0.009 0.201 0.668 
Oklahoma -0.205 0.256 -0.109 0.269 
Indiana -0.206 -0.021 0.648 -0.073 
Colorado -0.214 0.021 0.102 0.198 
South Dakota -0.232 0.105 0.279 -0.368 
Illinois -0.255 0.133 0.478 0.378 
North Carolina -0.437 0.125 0.031 -0.043 
Alabama -0.452 -0.377 0.214 0.063 
Figure 3 shows the relationships between year-over-year state aid changes and spending 
fairness changes over time, within select states. The point of figure 4 is to illustrate specifically what 
has happened in the most recent three years (08-09, 09-10, 10-11), as state aid declined and spending 
fairness fell with it. The most recent three years of data are shown in orange. In New Jersey, in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s, state aid increases were common. And with those state aid increases 
came increases to the fairness index of current spending. Those increases all fall in the upper right 
quadrant of the figure. But, in the most recent three years, decreases in state aid led to declining 
spending progressiveness. New York shows a similar picture for 2009-10 and 2010-11, but had some 
increase the prior year. In both of the two most recent periods as aid declined so too did the fairness 
ratio. In Kansas the biggest reductions of aid and decline in fairness occur in 2009-10, with those 
reductions then held constant in 2010-11. Notably, in Kansas and Texas there is a less clear 
relationship between aid increases and funding fairness than in New York or New Jersey.  
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Figure 3. State Funding Level and Spending Fairness (Examples) 
Finally, Table 4 summarizes the most recent three years of changes in current spending and 
state and local revenue fairness ratios by state, with states having the biggest declines in fairness 
ratios listed from top to bottom. 36 states had a three year average reduction in current spending 
fairness between 2008-09 and 2010-11 and 32 states had a three year average reduction in state and 
local revenue fairness over that same time period. At the top of the list are some states with 
particularly unstable estimates, because they are small in total population and/or have very few 
school districts. These include Wyoming, Utah, Nevada and Alaska. Colorado’s reduction in 
progressiveness results primarily from a one year data reporting issue, with substantially greater 
spending and revenue reported for Denver public schools in 2008.  Colorado’s decline in spending 
fairness occurs entirely from 2008 to 2009.  
Setting these states aside, New Jersey tops the list in reduced fairness in funding, with three 
years in a row of declining fairness ratios for current spending. Arizona, Delaware and 
Massachusetts also have three years in a row of declining spending fairness but with smaller 
magnitude changes. While some states show positive changes to fairness, these are nearly all very 
small, meaning that spending in these states remained relatively flat.  
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Table 4. 
Year over Year Changes in Fairness Index from 2008-09 to 2010-11 
Current Spending State & Local Revenue 
2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 3yr Mean 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 3yr Mean 
Decline Count 32 30 28 36 32 34 32 32 
Average -0.05 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.01 -0.03 
Wyoming 0.13 -0.57 -0.12 -0.19 -0.20 -0.21 -0.11 -0.17 
Utah -0.35 -0.19 0.01 -0.18 -0.07 -0.28 0.03 -0.11 
Nevada -0.61 0.13 -0.03 -0.17 -0.32 -0.09 -0.06 -0.15 
Alaska 0.17 -0.65 -0.01 -0.16 -0.16 -0.87 -0.19 -0.41 
Colorado -0.54 0.05 0.03 -0.15 * -0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 
New Jersey -0.12 -0.03 -0.18 -0.11 0.06 -0.29 -0.09 -0.11 
Florida -0.32 0.07 -0.05 -0.10 0.00 0.11 -0.05 0.02 
Montana -0.01 -0.25 0.02 -0.08 -0.09 -0.17 -0.01 -0.09 
Arizona -0.02 -0.15 -0.04 -0.07 0.08 0.00 -0.06 0.01 
Delaware -0.12 -0.02 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.23 -0.01 -0.10 
Massachusetts -0.08 -0.03 -0.08 -0.06 -0.16 0.02 -0.08 -0.07 
Minnesota -0.27 0.05 0.04 -0.06 -0.05 0.03 -0.07 -0.03 
Oregon -0.03 -0.10 -0.03 -0.05 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 
Vermont 0.04 -0.12 -0.08 -0.05 -0.07 -0.20 -0.02 -0.09 
Idaho -0.15 -0.03 0.05 -0.05 -0.07 -0.13 0.21 0.00 
Kansas -0.06 -0.09 0.01 -0.05 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
Nebraska -0.08 -0.03 0.00 -0.04 0.01 -0.17 0.02 -0.05 
Iowa -0.05 -0.11 0.05 -0.04 -0.01 -0.09 0.04 -0.02 
Maine -0.09 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.09 -0.06 0.01 
Washington -0.07 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 0.01 -0.02 
Maryland -0.08 -0.02 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.10 0.00 -0.04 
Arkansas -0.01 -0.05 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 
Oklahoma 0.00 0.00 -0.08 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.05 0.01 
Missouri -0.01 0.00 -0.05 -0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 
Connecticut -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.10 -0.08 -0.07 
Indiana 0.02 -0.06 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 
California -0.03 -0.04 0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 0.04 -0.01 
New Hampshire 0.36 -0.05 -0.36 -0.02 0.22 0.04 -0.23 0.01 
Texas -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
North Dakota 0.01 0.01 -0.06 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 
Ohio 0.01 -0.05 0.00 -0.01 -0.06 -0.05 0.00 -0.04 
Wisconsin -0.05 0.00 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.05 0.01 0.01 
Rhode Island 0.02 0.00 -0.04 -0.01 0.00 -0.04 0.00 -0.01 
Kentucky -0.04 0.06 -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 
New Mexico -0.04 -0.01 0.04 0.00 0.05 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 
New York 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.03 0.01 0.00 
Illinois 0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.06 -0.01 0.13 0.02 
Virginia 0.03 0.05 -0.06 0.01 0.05 -0.03 -0.07 -0.01 
South Carolina 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.07 -0.02 
Tennessee -0.05 0.03 0.04 0.01 -0.08 0.03 0.01 -0.01 
Louisiana 0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.11 -0.09 0.01 
Michigan -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.01 
Georgia 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Mississippi 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.01 
Pennsylvania 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04 -0.05 -0.01 -0.01 
North Carolina -0.02 0.09 0.00 0.02 -0.28 -0.07 0.40 0.02 
Alabama 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.02 -0.01 0.02 
South Dakota -0.06 0.11 0.07 0.04 -0.05 0.06 -0.02 0.00 
West Virginia -0.06 0.01 0.26 0.07 -0.12 0.14 0.06 0.03 
*Anomalous bump in spending for Denver Public Schools occurs in 2008.
It is important not to forget that these changes occur against different baseline conditions, 
including different overall levels of spending and different degrees of progressiveness. New Jersey 
and Massachusetts experience reduced funding fairness, but both were previously among the most 
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progressively funded states. New Jersey falls behind Massachusetts by the end of the period, because 
its declines are more substantial.  Utah also experiences a decline in fairness and had relatively high 
fairness ratio at the outset, but very low average overall spending. By contrast, New York, Illinois 
and Pennsylvania appear to remain relatively unchanged in terms of fairness during the recession. 
But, for these three states this merely means that they have retained their already regressive state 
school finance systems. They may not have gotten much worse, but they also didn’t get better.  
Conclusions & Policy Implications 
The recent recession yielded an unprecedented decline in public school funding fairness. 
Thirty-six states had a three year average reduction in current spending fairness between 2008-09 
and 2010-11 and 32 states had a three year average reduction in state and local revenue fairness over 
that same time period. Over the entire 19-year period, only 15 states saw an overall decline in 
spending fairness. In years prior to 2008 (starting in 1993) only 11 states saw an overall decline in 
spending fairness.  
Declining funding fairness during the downturn resulted in part from cuts to state aid but 
also from a shifting role for federal aid.  Further, during the period from 2007-2011, local public 
school districts’ ability to offset losses to state aid varied. During the period from 2007-2011 
compared to earlier periods, we saw the largest number of states where low poverty districts had 
local revenue changes moving in the opposite direction of state aid and the smallest number of 
states where high poverty districts showed the same inverse relationship.  That is, during the 
downturn, low poverty districts compensated strongly for cuts to state aid while high poverty 
districts were unable to do the same.  
In general, over the long haul, increases to state aid levels help to improve spending fairness.  
We see less clear evidence of shifts in state aid fairness resulting in shifts to spending fairness.  We 
do, however, see that changes to local revenue fairness contribute to spending fairness. That is, this 
direct relationship suggests either or both that as local revenues become more disparate, so too does 
spending, and as local revenues become less disparate so too does spending.  Despite a generally 
positive role for state aid improving spending equity, the role of state aid is not uniformly positive.  
In a number of states (16), changes in state revenue appear inversely associated with changes in 
spending fairness, suggesting a tendency either of state revenue increases to be targeted to less needy 
districts or state revenue decreases to be targeted to more needy districts.   
Federal aid also seems to contribute to spending fairness. Changes to federal revenue 
fairness (targeting) contribute positively to spending fairness and changes to federal revenue levels 
also contribute to spending fairness. But, while the change in spending fairness resulting from a $1 
increases in federal aid may be stronger in magnitude than the response to state aid, the overall level 
of federal aid is much smaller and therefore its overall effect on equity more modest.  
While estimates herein shed some light on nationally representative patterns, above all else 
the findings herein highlight the heterogeneity of school finance across states. Yes, the recent 
downturn led to significant declines in funding fairness across a majority of states. Yes, state aid, on 
average, helps improve fairness. Yes, fairness of spending is compromised by disparity in access to 
local revenues. But, these relationships vary widely across states and defy simple classifications. In 
several states, abrupt policy decisions led to reclassification (Vermont and New Hampshire) or 
substitution (Michigan) of state and local revenue sources distorting the interplay between state and 
local revenues.  Yet none of these cases led to sustained, substantive improvements to spending 
equity.  
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While equity overall took a hit between 1997 and 2011, the initial state of funding equity 
varied widely at the outset of the period, with Massachusetts and New Jersey being among the most 
progressively funded states in 2007. Thus, they arguably had further to fall. Funding equity for many 
states has barely budged over time, and remained persistently regressive, for example in Illinois, New 
York and Pennsylvania.  Potential influences on these patterns are also evasive and widely varied. In 
Missouri, we see the 1990s influence of desegregation orders, which capitalized on the state’s 
matching aid program to generate additional revenue in Kansas City and St. Louis driving spending 
progressiveness, but when the state adopts a need weighted foundation aid formula in 2006, 
spending continues to become more regressive. We see the more logical influence of school finance 
reforms in Massachusetts in the early 1990s and in New Jersey in the late 1990s, following court 
order, targeting additional funds to needy districts yielding an overall pattern of progressiveness. 
Court order in New York State (2006) appears to have had little or no influence on equity and the 
influence of court orders over time in Kansas has moved the needle only slightly.  Better 
understanding role of judicial involvement requires significant additional exploration of these data 
linked to information on both judicial activity and legislative reforms.  
Increased availability of long run, annual longitudinal data for tracking ebbs and flows of 
state school finance systems creates new opportunities to explore both the causes and consequences 
of those shifts over time. The present article merely scratches the surface by describing those shifts 
and providing preliminary evaluation of their causes. Of particular interest are the long term 
consequences, including the extent to which the recent downturn alters the distribution of programs 
and services to children, or the distribution of teachers by observable attributes.  
The coming years will tell us both whether state school finance systems can rebound from 
the effects of the downturn or whether these effects have become permanent, and will inform us 
about the consequences for short and long term student outcomes. A significant body of literature 
has now shown the positive effects of equity and adequacy improvements of the prior 40+ years of 
school finance reform. Similar methods applied years from now may reveal the deleterious 
influences of these dark ages of American public school finance.  
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Appendix A 
Table A1. 
Data Elements and Sources 
Data Element Variable 
Name 
(construction) 
Unit of 
Analysis 
Data Source Years Available Years Imputed* 
(method) 
Per Pupil Spending PPCSTOT District F-33 1993-2011 
State Revenue STREV District F-33 1993-2011 
Local Revenue LREV District F-33 1993-2011 
Federal Revenue FEDREV District F-33 1993-2011 
Enrollment District CCD 1993-2011 
Grade Ranges K12 or not District CCD 1993-2011 
Pupil/Teacher 
Ratios 
PUPTCH District CCD 1993-2011 
Education 
Comparable Wage 
Index 
District Texas A&M 
(Taylor) 
1997-2011 1993-1996 (state 
x year 
extrapolation/ 
Interpolation) 
Child Poverty District Census Small 
Area Income 
and Poverty 
Estimates 
1995, 1997, 
1999, 2000-
2011 
1993-1994, 
1996, 1998 
(state x year 
extrapolation/ 
Interpolation) 
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